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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW S
Corporate Practice of Architecture
PRELUDE
Man's first attempt to build beauty into his dwellings proclaimed
the conception of architecture. As early civilizations built temples to
the gods, sculptors and artists moulded beauty into the design. By
the time Greece had become glorious, architecture as a calling was
well established. The word "architecture" itself is derived from the
Greek term for master-builder.
Thus, the mighty complex of today's building designs are nurtured
through roots that live alongside those of the professions of law,
medicine, and theology. As Britain developed, the latter three be-
came known as the "learned professions." Almost from the incep-
tion of the use of the word in modern times, this triad has been ac-
corded the respect and stature manifested by the word "profession-
al." An exploration of the connotations of the term is necessary in
the examination of how a particular calling may be affected by per-
mitting its practice as a corporate entity.
What Is A Profession?
A profession has been defined as a self-disciplined group of indi-
viduals who hold themselves out to the public as possessing a special
skill derived from training or education and who are prepared to ex-
ercise that skill primarily in the interest of others.1 A basic quality
that characterizes a profession is the self-prohibition of certain kinds
of conduct that might bring the professional group into disrepute,
even though the conduct might otherwise be profitable to the indi-
vidual.
The term has been extended to cover many callings that have
sought the dignity inferred from the title. As a result, a number of
categories of professions, not necessarily complete, may be enumer-
ated; first, the learned professions, such as law, medicine, and divin-
ity, wherein the practitioners render personal service only and the
practitioner-client relationship is a confidential one; second, the pro-
fession of industrial technicians such as engineers, architects, survey-
ors, and chemists, who function primarily in order to improve techni-
cal processes through scientific societies; third, the profession of of-
fice technicians such as accountants and actuaries who have their own
professional associations; fourth, the profession which embraces di-
rectors of men such as managers and superintendents; and fifth, the
profession of the arts: sculpture, painting, acting, and writing.'
1. Wright, What is a Profession, 29 CAN. B. REV. 748 (195 1); Characteristics and Functions
of a Profession, 82 SOL. J. 24 (1938); Blauch, Nature of a Profession, J. Accountancy, April
1956, p. 54.
2. Ibd.
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In addition to the above categories, the word "profession" has
been appropriated by embalmers, auctioneers, patent agents, pharma-
cists, beer and insurance salesmen, veterinarians, secretaries, and
many other callings, in an attempt to counteract the adverse implica-
tion of being termed a tradesman.3 The word has, of course, been
used in the mercenary sense, in sports, and in the military. Thus, to
speak of a profession is not to convey a precise idea; the meaning has
so decayed that it is virtually impossible to obtain a clear judicial in-
terpretation of whether a particular calling is a profession.
IWhether the practice of architecture is a profession in the eyes of
the law has not been adjudicated in most jurisdictions. A definitive
meaning has not been given to the typical section found in corpora-
tion codes that: "A corporation may not engage in a profession."5
Does the term "profession" include the practice of architecture? Or
is it restricted to "learned professions"? The question is resolved in
most jurisdictions by reference to a direct statement in the particular
Architect's Registration Law concerning whether a corporation may
practice architecture." But the professional status of architecture is
not thereby made certain.
Business or Profession.
There is some evidence concerning the tendency of architects to
lean more in the direction of a business entity than toward the con-
cept of a single practicing professional. This is especially true in the
instance of firms with several hundred employees engaged in the de-
sign of construction projects for corporate clients. The impersonal
practitioner-client relationship is evident when this type of activity is
compared with that of the physician in operating directly on his pa-
tient. However, architecture has not always been practiced primarily
as a business.
In its early days, architecture was practiced basically as an art.
As the vagaries of history altered construction techniques and artistic
tastes, the architect became a student of the past and a specialist in
design. Nineteenth century practitioners studied the work of their
predecessors and thus gradually required greater knowledge and skill
in order to be able to practice; the opportunity to categorize them-
selves as professionals grew accordingly. During the emergence of
the twentieth century, as technical and artistic complexities were be-
3. Wright, supra note 1, at 751.
4. Wright, supra note 1, at 752; Farnsworth, The Nature of a Profession, 8 MODERN L. REV.
163 (1945). There is some authority to the effect that a calling which is licensed by the
state on the basis of personal qualifications, constitutes a profession; this would include plumb-
ers, electricians and beauticians; see 13 AM. JIUR. Corporations § 838 (1938); Note, Practice
of the Learned Professions, 4 U. PrIT. L REV. 244 (1938).
5. OHIO REV. CODE § 1701.03; Campbell, Illegal Practice of a Profession, 25 CAN. B. REV.
1146 (1947).
6. Annot., 56 A.L.2d 726 (1957).
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ing imposed upon the structures, architects found it necessary to spend
even more time in "professional" training.7 Finally, with the gen-
erally felt governmental tendency to regulate activities that affect the
public health, safety, and welfare, registration laws were passed in
many jurisdictions ostensibly creating a legal category of profession-
alism in architecture.
But the construction needs of the twentieth century expanded al-
most exponentially. The individual practitioner, while still able to
cope with minor local construction needs, has in general given way to
the large partnership and corporation, where the latter is permitted.
The clients, too, have changed with the times. Historically, the
church or a European nobleman was the architect's large-budget
client. But ordinary individual architectural practice concerned ordi-
nary individual clients. The close personal relationship of architect
and client was more or less a prevalent part of the practitioner's busi-
ness life. This situation persists today primarily for those architects
whose practices cater to the individual home builder.
By far the greater percentage of the construction dollar is now
spent, however, by the corporate client whose requirements are vastly
different from those of the individual home owner. With an indus-
trial plant, an airport, a Caribbean hotel, an urban redevelopment
project, or a Brasilia, an architect-client relationship is created which
differs greatly from that involved in the family of four who wants
an expandable home. But the legal relationships of an architect and
client have remained virtually unchanged, even though the internal
architectural organization has had to change drastically in order to
meet the modern client's needs. Not uncommon are firms with sev-
eral hundred employees covering all branches of architectural services
from design, economic analysis, and engineering, to office methods,
accounting, and public relations staffs. In effect, these firms act and
look like corporations, but usually are partnerships in form.
Another characteristic of many mid-century clients that has ef-
fected a change in service requirements is the international scope of
many of their operations. This feature has brought about the need
for greater stability in the architectural firm, as well as the financial
strength requisite for manifold operations. These needs are satisfied
by the very large partnership organizations conducting themselves
with the external stability of a corporation.
Dilemma of Professional Corporate Practice
The corporate form of business entity has characteristics with re-
gard to continuity, planning, and tax status that seem to make it de-
sirable as a form for professional practice. There are, however, nu-
merous objections that are normally offered against proposals to in-
7. AMERucAN INSTITUTE OF ARCHITECTS, WHAT IT IS, WHAT IT DOES (1959).
[Septemnber
NOTES
corporate. Some of these arise out of a semantic problem occasioned
by such adverse connotations of the word "corporation" as size, rob-
ber-baron tendencies, gluttony, ruthlessness, Kruppism, or economic
persecution. This type of emotional reaction creates an atmosphere
in which reason cannot exist. Further, there is a lack of recognition
that many different types of corporate entities, other than the ordi-
nary business corporation, already exist under various statutory en-
actments. Charitable corporations, non-profit corporations, public
corporations, government corporations, and the corporation sole are
examples. Thus, the legal mind is capable of creating and procreat-
ing the concepts necessary to provide for the needs of the social and
business community.
There seems, then, to be no real reason why a business entity can-
not be devised that has the acceptable and desirable characteristics
of a business corporation, but that will also provide for the special
needs of the professional practitioner.
Some of the basic reasons usually offered against proposals for
the corporate practice of a profession are: first, professional practi-
tioners are licensed, and since a corporation may not be examined for
license purposes, it may not be a professional*; second, since a corpora-
tion is a body without a soul, it cannot have the characteristics that
are necessary for the personal relationship required between a client
and a practitioner and, hence, it would not be able to retain a position
of trust; third, even though a corporation employs a registered prac-
titioner, his primary duty would be to his corporate employer rather
than to the client, thus circumscribing the normal practitioner-client
relationship; fourth, public policy prohibits an intervention for profit
by a third party, i.e., the corporation, in establishing the practitioner-
client relationship; fifth, title to corporate shares, although entirely
owned initially by licensed practitioners, could be transferred by sale,
operation of law, or succession, and thus, the shares would find their
way into the hands of unlicensed laymen who would then own a
corporation that was engaged in professional practice; sixth, a corpo-
ration could not be suspended or disbarred; and seventh, the corpo-
rate insulation of practitioners from liability in malpractice suits
would result in greater risk to the public."
Since the corporation is a creature created by the state, there is
no valid reason why the state cannot mold what it will. Thus, each
of the above objections, and doubtless others which could be raised,
can be answered%" a corporation with special characteristics. Such
a proposal has indeed been made, and does provide the answers.' No
8. Jones, The Professional Corporation, 27 FORDHAM L. REv. 353 (1958); Lewis, Corporate
Capacity to Practice Law, 2 MD. L. REv. 342 (1938); Note, Practice of Law, Medicine and
Dentistry by Corporations, 10 So. CAr. L. REV. 329 (1937); Note, Corporate Practice of the
Law, 34 COLUM. L REv. 571 (1934); Acton, Unlawul Practice of Law, 24 ILL. BAR J. 282
(1936); 19 C.J.S. Corporations § 956 (1940); 13 Am. JuR. Corporations § 837 (1938).
9. Jones, supra note 8, at 360.
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sincere professional practitioner would doubt the validity of many, if
not all, of the objections to the corporate form. However, if the
practitioner retains his present client relationship, but stands as a
corporate entity for all other purposes, it would seem that many ad-
vantages might accrue.
What are these pressing needs that have been pushing the pro-
fessions in the direction of some type of corporate form? Of basic
importance now, and undoubtedly of increasing significance in the fu-
ture, are the tax considerations. The tax shelter accorded corporate
entities is manifested in such arrangements as profit-sharing and re-
tirement plans, pension plans, deductible premium group life insur-
ance, health and welfare plans and deferred compensation plans.10
But "all that glisters" is not savings. The corporate gambit may
well result in a checkmate for the Treasury Department. For exam-
ple, the corporation might be categorized as a personal holding com-
pany under section 543 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. In
that event, all undistributed income would be taxed at a rate of 75
per cent of the first $2,000, and all in excess of the $2,000 would be
taxed at the rate of 85 per cent." Such a catastrophe would quickly
place the one-man professional corporation in search of a cooperage.
Further, accumulated earnings are taxed at a rate of 2 7 Y2 per cent
on the excess. To avoid both or either of these results might not be
possible. There is, of course, the possibility of a sub-chapter S elec-
tion, 12 that is, the election by a small business corporation to be taxed
as a partnership. By the express terms of the code, this would avoid
the personal holding company tax, but it has disadvantages with re-
gard to regulations prohibiting certain fringe benefit deductions.3
Another possibility that confronts the one-man professional corpora-
tion is the disregarding of the corporate entity by the Treasury De-
partment if it appears that incorporation was effected solely for the
purpose of tax avoidance. 4 Various other corporate tax hurdles with
respect to liquidations, redemptions, and distributions equated to divi-
dends, all stand in the path of the professional corporation.' 5
Obviously, then, the tax aspects of professional incorporation will
not only vary with the size of the corporation, but may actually in-
crease tax liability over that which would be incurred by the partner-
ship or individual practitioner; it thus appears that it is not feasible
to make a precise prediction regarding the degree of tax shelter that
might accrue to the professional corporation. But this much may be
stated: all business corporations are faced with these same problems;
10. Jones, Should Lawyers Incorporate, 11 HASTINGS L.J. 150, 152 (1959).
11. Jones, supra note 8, at 366.
12. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1371-77.
13. Jones, supra note 10.
14. Commissioner v. Smith, 136 F.2d 556 (2d Cir. 1943).
15. Jones, supra note 8, at 371.
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the professional man now has no opportunity, as do other lines of
endeavor, to make a choice. Thus, from the tax standpoint, the eight
million professional taxpayers are readily categorized as second-class
citizens. 16
Another tax advantage of the corporate form often overlooked
is the increased liquidity of equity compared with the partnership
form and the capital gain tax rate that applies to the value of the
corporate shares upon transfer, if the assets of the corporation have
grown during the shareholder's tenure. If these shares are to re-
main within the licensed profe ssional ownership domain for ethical
reasons, thus necessitating a sale upon the demise of the professional
shareholder, the heirs become the recipients of substantial benefits
through the increased value of the estate, i.e., by the lower capital
gains tax as opposed to the normal tax on income that would have
been received by the practitioner during his lifetime. Although a
similar savings would accrue if the practitioner were to retire and
liquidate his corporate holdings, a further advantage results where
the stock passes at the shareholder's death: the beneficiary takes on
a stepped up basis, namely, the capital value of the stock at the time
of death, which may result in very little, if any, capital gains tax at all.
Another advantage of the corporate form which may be advanced
is the continuity that is created by virtue of the creating statute. The
disturbances that can occur upon the death or disability of a partner,
for example, are thus eliminated. The leverage created by the corpo-
rate accumulation of working capital also builds the financial strength
and stability of the business entity; the result is more assured service
to clients, no matter how complex or large the requirements may be.
As professional firms grow in physical size, the organizational
difficulties of a normal partnership become overwhelming. The need
and desire for loyal members of the firm to acquire a measure of
ownership are easily answered in the corporate form through the
medium of stock distribution. The statutory standardization of
methods of management, organization, and finance create an atmos-
phere of efficiency in operation that is evidenced in the widespread
industrial use of the corporate form.
In our complex, dynamic economy, it would appear that those pro-
fessions whose clients look for business characteristics in their ad-
visors, would do well to consider carefully the corporate form.
The one theme that appears to be common in the image of all the large
and successful [architectural] firms is that their reputation is grounded
as much in sound business principles as that of the successful soap
manufacturer or television manufacturer. Essentially, they are business
men whose business is architecture, and their major clients and prospects
are never allowed to forget this.17
16. Jones, supra note 10, at 155.
17. BURSON, The Architect and Public Relations, Architectural Record, Feb. 1960, p. 166.
See also Architectural Record, April 1960, p. 207.
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STATUS OF CORPORATE PRACTICE
The regulation of the practice of architecture is accomplished by
statute in every state of the Union,' and thus, the status of the corpo-
rate practice of architecture varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
The corporation codes of some states, such as Ohio, prohibit the
corporate practice of a profession. 9 The similar common-law prohi-
bition was directed toward the learned professions, 0 but, generally
the statutory prohibition has been held applicable to other profes-
sions.2' Statutes sometimes provide that in the case of architecture,
a corporation may not itself practice the profession, but may employ
licensed practitioners to do so. 2 2  However, in some states architec-
ture may be practiced by a corporation.2 3
In a Pennsylvania case, it was held that under the registration
act, 24 even though a corporation is composed of licensed architects, it
cannot itself secure a certificate qualifying it to practice the profes-
sion of architecture.25  This case also held that since the licensing
statute used the personal pronouns in referring to licensees, only nat-
ural persons were implied, and thus, corporations may not practice
architecture in Pennsylvania.
In Colorado, because of an ambiguity in the licensing law, a cor-
poration was held not to be able to contract to furnish architectural
services even though the corporation was composed of licensed archi-
tects, because the corporation is incapable of becoming a licensed
architect itself.26 The court admitted, however, that the legislature
could permit the granting of licenses to corporations. Subsequently,
the Colorado legislature clarified the law by specifically prohibiting
such corporate practice.
In New York, a corporation has been held to be unable to secure
a certificate qualifying it to practice architecture. 8 But by statute,
18. Supra note 7.
19. OFHO REV. CODE § 1701.03; 19 C.J.S. Corporations § 955 (1955); 14A C.J. Corpora-
tions S 2145 (1921).
20. In re Co-operative Law Co., 198 N.Y. 479, 92 N.E. 15 (1910); L Meisel & Co. v. Na-
tional Jewelers' Bd. of Trade, 152 N.Y. Supp. 913 (App. Div. 1915); Hannon v. Siegel-Cooper
Co., 60 N.E. 597 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1901).
21. 14A C.J. Corporations § 2145 (1921).
22. People ex rel. State Bd. of Examiners v. Rodgers Co., 277 Ill. 151, 115 N.E. 146 (1917).
23. ARK. STAT. § 71-302 (3) (1957); CAL. BUS. AND PROF. CODE §§ 5535-37.
24. PA. STAT. tit. 63, §5 28-31 (1959).
25. Simons, Brittain & English, Inc. v. Citizen's National Bank, 5 Pa. D. & C. 393 (C.P.
1924); 56 A.L.R.2d 726 (1957).
26. Johnson Olmsted Realty Co. v. City and County of Denver, 89 Colo. 250, 1 P.2d 928
(1931), overruled on another point in McNichols v. City and County of Denver, 130 Colo.
202, 274 P.2d 317 (1954).
27. COLO. REV. STAT., CuM. Supp. 10-2-10 (2) (1955).
28. American Store Equip. & Constr. Corp. v. Jack Dempsey's Punch Bowl, Inc., 174 Misc.
436, 21 N.Y.S.2d 117 (1939), aff'd, 258 App. Div. 794, 16 N.Y.S.2d 702 (1939), appeal
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a lawfully organized corporation in existence prior to 1929 and
practicing continuously since then may continue to practice architec-
ture, provided the chief executive officer is a licensed architect.29
Although the Florida statutes prevent the issuance of a certifi-
cate to a corporation for the practice of architecture, it was held in
Weed v. Horning" that a registered architect who was the sole stock-
holder in a corporation could legally collect for services that were
furnished through the medium of the corporation.
In Illinois, it has been held that a corporation not licensed as an
architect may contract to do architectural work if it employs a li-
censed architect to do the work,3 or if the work is performed by and
under the direction of a duly licensed architect who is an employee of
the corporation. 2  Another Illinois case"3 has held that where a
corporation contracts to furnish architectural services, any lawfully
licensed member of the corporation may perform the services, and the
fact that one or more members of the corporation are not licensed
architects does not invalidate the contract.
In California and in Texas, corporate practice of architecture is
specifically permitted by the code.34 It has been held that under the
California registration act, a corporation that undertakes to perform
architectural services may do so if it employs a certificated architect
to prepare the plans,3 5 but it may also furnish services without having
plans prepared by a certificated architect if it so informs its client.38
Another California case held that a corporation that prepares pre-
liminary plans largely by unlicensed and unsupervised employees is
not entitled to recover for their preparation.3 7
In People v. Allied Architect's 4ssociation,8 the California court
distinguished between the corporate practice of architecture and the
corporate practice of law primarily on the basis of the confidential
relationship between attorney and client, and said that while the reg-
istration act did not permit a corporation itself to be licensed, a cor-
poration could employ licensed architects and contract with others for
denied, 258 App. Div. 876, 17 N.Y.S.2d 220 (1939), aff'd, 283 N.Y. 601, 28 N.E.2d 23
(1940).
29. N.Y. EDUCATION LAWS § 7307.
30. Robert L. Weed, Architect, Inc. v. Horning, 159 Fla. 847, 33 So. 2d 648 (1947).
31. Keenan v. Tooma, 240 III App. 448 (1926).
32. Continental Paper Co. v. Fisher, 3 III. App. 2d 118, 129 N.E.2d 577 (1945); People
ex iel. State Bd. of Examiners v. Rodgers Co., 277 III. 151, 115 N.E. 146 (1917).
33. Haynes v. E. St. Louis Council No. 592 Knights of Columbus, 258 III. App. 38 (1930).
34. TEX. Civ. STAT. tit. 32, art. 1302 (45) (1945); CAL. Bus. AND PROF. CODE § 5535-37.
Interpretation of the latter is found in Binford v. Boyd, 178 Cal. 458, 174 Pac. 56 (1918).
35. Binford v. Boyd, 178 Cal. 458, 174 Pac. 56 (1918).
36. People v. Allied Architect's Ass'n, 201 Cal. 428, 257 Pac. 511 (1927); Walter M.
Ballard Corp v. Dougherty, 106 Cal. App. 2d 35, 234 P.2d 745 (1951).
37. Meyer v. Bowman, 121 Cal. App. 112, 8 P.2d 936 (1932).
38. 201 Cal. 428, 257 Pac. 511 (1927).
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architectural services. In Ballard v. Dougherty,39 it was held that
the statute applied to foreign corporations as well and that the rule
in Binford v. Boyd4° permitting corporate practice was valid.
In a 1954 Georgia case, it was held that the "personal pronoun"
type statute did not preclude the practice of architecture by a corpo-
ration.4' Proposed new licensing legislation in Georgia specifically
permits the corporate practice of architecture.42
Arkansas permits architectural practice by a corporation provided
the principals of the corporation are each registered architects and
that their names appear in the corporation name.43 In a case involv-
ing a corporation,44 it was held that compliance with the statute was
not effected by the corporation merely employing an architect.
Those courts that have adjudicated the question of the corporate
practice of architecture have based their decisions primarily on statu-
tory grounds. To these courts, corporate practice may be rendered
objectionable irrespective of any considerations of confidential client
relationships such as are found in the learned professions. 45 Al-
though it is clear that architecture, like the learned professions, is
creative work and involves high ethical considerations, it is not at all
clear that the public interest suffers when architects incorporate in
order to practice their calling.46 Where the public interest is ade-
quately protected by the licensing statute, some courts are not un-
willing to permit corporate practice.4 7
It is generally supposed, and is specifically provided by statute in
New York,48 that a professional corporation organized prior to the
enactment of legislative prohibitions may continue to practice after
such enactment. However, there is some doubt concerning the valid-
ity of such an assumption. A recent Ohio appellate case 49 stated that
although corporate charters possess the elements of a contract, the
state may, under the reserved powers clause of the Ohio Constitu-
tion,50 alter or repeal laws under which corporations are formed. The
court specifically held that the later enacted legislation preventing
39. Walter M. Ballard Corp. v. Dougherty, 106 Cal. App. 2d 35, 234 P.2d 745 (1951).
40. 178 Cal. 458, 174 Pac. 56 (1918).
41. Folsom v. Summer, Locatell & Co., 90 Ga. App. 696, 83 S.E.2d 855 (1954).
42. HB 355, Ga. Leg. (Jan. 25, 1960) to revise GA. CODE ANNOT., 84-301-22 (1952).
43. ARK. STAT. § 71-302 (3) (1957).
44. Arkansas State Bd. of Architects v. Bank Bldg. & Equip. Corp., 225 Ark. 889, 286 S.W.2d
323 (1956).
45. Note, Corporations Doing Professional Service Through Others, 45 MIcH. L. REV. 885
(1947).
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid.
48. N. Y. EDUCATION LAWS § 7307.
49. H. C. Downer & Ass'n, Inc. v. Westgate Realty Co., Docket No. 4892, 9th Dist. Ct.
App. Ohio, Nov. 25, 1959.
50. OHIo CoNsT. art. XIII, § 2.
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corporate practice effectively modified the original corporate charter
to the extent of "making the plaintiff corporation legally incapable
of lawfully practicing the engineering or architectural professions."'"
Thus, at least in Ohio, the penumbra of doubt is cast over other pro-
fegsional corporations similarly chartered.
There is a dearth of case law in this area, but it seems that since
architectural registration laws are enacted ostensibly for the public
safety, the application of the strict approach accorded the corporate
practice of a learned profession is somewhat inappropriate with re-
gard to architecture. The public is safeguarded from the improper
activity of corporate entities in other areas; why can it not be in this
one? The courts seem somewhat confused by the meaning of the
word "profession," and tend to interpret the restrictive legislation
accordingly. Only in jurisdictions where specific permissive statutes
exist, do the courts freely concede the legality of the corporate prac-
tice of architecture.
FUTURE TRENDS
The proposals that have been made, and referred to above, con-
cerning the possibility of a special type of corporate form to be used
by professionals would answer most if not all of the reasoned objec-
tions made by those who have examined the problem. The possibil-
ity also exists of effecting these "professional corporate restrictions"
under existing corporation codes.
The practice of architecture by or through the medium of corpo-
rations in at least seven states52 with a total population of over fifty-
one million persons would indicate that the public can be adequately
protected without the necessity of special types of corporations. The
future of the professional status of the architect is a question that
seems answerable in terms of considerations other than the effect on
the profession of the use of the corporate form. The following com-
ment by an internationally known architect seems pertinent:
And just as the role of architecture will grow in public life, so will it
grow in industry. More than merely rendering a professional service to
his client, the architect will be a valued advisor, especially in site selection
and economic matters involving land values and probably building costs
.... More and more important is the fact that buildings must be sound
investments for clients. With the ever increasing need for sound eco-
nomic planning in all types of building projects, during the coming
51. H. C. Downer & Ass'n, Inc. v. Westgate Realty Co., Docket No. 4892, 9th Dist. Ct. App.
Ohio, Nov. 25, 1959. But see, State ex rel. McElroy, Attorney Gen. v. A. M. Kinney, Inc.,
171 Ohio St. 193 (1960). [Ed.]
52. Arkansas, California, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, New York, and Texas. It appears notable
that the American Institute of Architects is itself a corporation; further, one of the duties
of the A.I.A. Committee on Professional Insurance is: "To intensify the study of advantages
and disadvantages of rendering architectural services by incorporation of architectural
firms ...." A.LA. Document 1-101-C (1960).
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decade we will be a part of public and business life as we have never
been before.53
Another applicable comment was made by a Design School Dean:
The new architect will be planner, coordinator, consultant, and compre-
hensive designer - knowledgeable in the complexity of the new tech-
nology and the changing factors of an exploding economy.54
It appears that clients are even now looking for economic and
business characteristics in their architect as well as for the aesthetic
features that have historically been the practitioner's basic distin-
guishing professional feature. The latter is no longer sufficient. As
mentioned above,55 the business of architecture is already in existence.
Practitioners in fact do not have the personal confidential client rela-
tionship that characterizes the learned professions, and the trend is
ever further away. The written contract that usually exists between
an architect and his client is an example of a distinguishing business
feature that is not normally present in the learned professions. Re-
cent decisions tending toward finding architects liable for negligence
to third persons not privy to a contract,58 comprise another page in
the book of architect-business characteristics.
Thus, the professional status seems to be changing, regardless of
the business form or medium through which the profession is prac-
ticed.
A unique development that affects the architectural profession is
the quirk of history that has separated it from the engineering pro-
fession. The separation with regard to the branches of engineering
that are applicable to the construction industry seems unfortunate, if
not arbitrary, in view of the great similarity and the overlapping of
these functions. This overlapping is generally recognized by statute
through provisions in the architectural and engineering registration
acts giving architects the prerogative of practicing such engineering
as may be incidental to the practice of architecture and conversely,
giving engineers the right to practice such architecture as may be inci-
dental to the practice of engineering. Where does one stop and the
other begin? A substantial amount of acrimony between the profes-
sions has developed in recent years as modern buildings have required
more and more engineering talents in their design. A recent New
Jersey hearing before a special board was conducted for considera-
tion of the question of whether or not a project with only a minor
amount of engineering in its design, as opposed to the architecture
53. Becket, The Decade Ahead, Architectural and Engineering News, Jan. 1960, p. 14.
.54. Kamphoefner, ibid.
55. Burson, supra note 17.
56. Note, Architects' and Engineers' Third Party Negligence Liability, 10 WEST. RES. L.
REv. 563 (1959).
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involved, was nevertheless within the prerogatives of the engineering
profession.57
What is the effect of this phenomenon on corporate practice? As
the profession of engineering grew, it saw fit, in contradistinction to
architecture, to permit its members to engage in building contracting.
This was a primary force in the early trend toward incorporation
within the profession of engineering.
Thirty-four states now permit the corporate practice of engineer-
ing in some manner, usually limited only by requirements as to the
registration of certain personnel."' Three more states permit prac-
tice by corporations organized prior to the enactment of restrictive
legislation.59 Four other states indicate that corporate practice is
permitted, with certain limitations."' Thus, only nine states and the
District of Columbia completely prohibit the corporate practice of
engineering.61
Here then, is a major rent in the architect's professional armor.
Engineering corporations that are engaged in the design and con-
struction of buildings are legally practicing architecture incidental to
their engineering and are finding corporate clients who not only do
not seem to be adversely affected thereby, but who appear increas-
ingly to order their construction requirements through that medium.
The implications are that, like television, corporate practice is here to
stay. It seems to be somewhat naive to divorce the profession from
the needs of the economy. Engineering corporations and industrial-
designer corporations are not only meeting these needs, but are tak-
ing advantage of the apparent abandonment by the architects, and
are virtually pre-empting new areas, while absorbing others that
were once within the exclusive province of the architectural profes-
sion."
The practice of medicine in the corporate form through medical
"associations" and incorporated hospitals has been in existence for
many years. 3 The laws of Connecticut and Oklahoma have been
amended to permit the corporate practice of medicine.64 A substan-
tial amount of activity has taken place regarding the possibilities of
57. Am. Eng'r., Dec. 1959, p. 31. See Douglas v. Smulski, 20 Conn. Supp. 236, 131 A.2d
225 (1957); People v. Babcock, 343 Mich. 671, 73 N.W.2d 521 (1955); Am. Eng'r., Feb
1960, p. 46.
58. Stitt, Corporate Practie of Engineering, 14 Bus. LAW. 969, 985 (1959).
59. Id. at 987.
60. Id. at 988.
61. Ibid.
62. Bourne, The New Rivals: Architects and Designers, Architectural Forum, April 1960,
p. 138.
63. Jones, Should Lawyers Incorporate, 11 HASTINGS L.J. 150, 155 (1959).
64. Ibid.
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the corporate practice of law. 68 Architecture is thus not alone in its
bewilderment.
Several possibilities exist for gaining some of the advantages of
the corporate entity, while nevertheless retaining the individual prac-
titioner or partnership form in order to conform to the fiction of pro-
fessional status. One of these is the Keough-Simpson bill,66 which
in its present form would permit professionals and other self-em-
ployed persons to deduct up to $2,500 of income per year for pen-
sion plans. This bill was originally introduced in Congress as the
Jenkins-Keough bill in 1951 " It was reintroduced several times and
was actually passed by the House in 1958.68 The Treasury Depart-
ment's opposition has been against the draft of the bill that would
not only permit self-employed persons to set up their own pension
plans without requiring a provision for retirement compensation for
employees, but that would also permit the taxpayer to vary his retire-
ment payments from year to year as a means of minimizing annual
taxable income; as of April 1960, this opposition was in the process
of being mitigated.69 Thus, after nine years of negotiation, there
seems to be a modicum of blue on the horizon. But this bill, even if
ultimately passed, would be merely a partial answer, and only in a
narrow area of taxation; the other corporate advantages, where these
are desirable, would remain non-existent.
Another possibility is that suggested by a federal court in United
States v. Kintner.70 Over the strenuous opposition of the Treasury
Department, an unincorporated association of physicians in Montana
was permitted to pay its taxes as a corporation' and thus enjoy the
benefits of a pension plan. 2 In that case the association was organ-
ized as a clinic with the individual doctors as employees; full mana-
gerial powers, including the fixing of salaries, were vested in a com-
mittee. Probably few professionals would agree to this type of
corollary restriction even though a tax saving were to result. The
Commissioner has not acquiesced; however, a proposed regulation
has been issued regarding situations similar to Kintner.73  Thus,
there is no way of knowing what tax status would exist if a group of
architects, or even another group of doctors, were similarly to organ-
ize. Here, again, the results, even if attained, would be beneficial
65. Ibid.; Wormser, Corporations and the Practice of Law, 5 FORDHAM L. REv. 207 (1936).
66. H.R. 10, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1958).
67. H.R. 4371, H.R. 4373, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951).
68. Jones, The Professional Corporation, 27 FORDHAM L. REV. 353, 364 (1958).
69. Wall St. Journal, Feb. 24, 1960, p. 1, col. 5.
70. United States v. Kintner, 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954); Galt v. United States, 175 F.
Supp. 360 (5th Cir. 1959).
71. 26 U.S.C. § 401 (1958).
72. Jones, supra note 67, at 364.
73. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 301.7701, 24 Fed. Reg. 10423 (1959).
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prifnarily insofar as a pension plan is concerned; other corporate tax
advantages would accrue, but no other features of the corporate
-f6rm would be available.
Another avenue of escape is the professional use of the business
form known as the common-law joint stock company. This entity
consists of an organization of partners who provide in their agree-
ment that the partnership will not dissolve upon the death of a part-
ner; that the organization will be managed by a group of annually
elected directors; that each partner's share will be represented by a
certificate called "stock"; that no partner will be liable for any debt
beyond the amount of his original contribution; and other similar
corporation-type provisions. The joint stock company is thus a part-
nership in law, but is organized as though it were a corporation. Pre-
sumably, it would be taxed as a corporation.
Where this type of entity is permitted by state law, it would seem
to be the best answer to those who would like to gain the corporate
tax and organizational advantages, but retain the partnership form.
However, the attitude of the Treasury Department in that regard is
not clear; since this business form was organized primarily as a result
of early attempts to limit generally partnership liability, it is distin-
guishable from a corporation for tax purposes in a manner similar
to the partnership that elects to be taxed as a corporation. 7 The
election refers only to income taxation, and does not result in permis-
sion to deduct pension payments or other corporate-type expenses.
In view of the very limited familiarity, even by attorneys, with this
business form, there is great likelihood that it would indeed be viewed
as a subterfuge and thus not eligible for the fringe tax benefits avail-
able to a corporation. It would appear then, that this solution would
take the practitioner into uncharted waters that could test not only
the quality of his seamanship, but the seaworthiness of his business
form as well.
What, then, is the most constructive approach? Should the key-
stone of the professional arch be the phantom word "profession,"
with its status significance that disappears as more callings become
"professions"? Must the concept of professional ethical character-
istics be attached only to a particular form of business enterprise?
The configuration should certainly not be such as to deteriorate the
ethical considerations of the professional, but neither should the busi-
ness form be determined on the basis of the fiction that it will neces-
sarily destroy the profession.
The following salient features are pertinent: first, because of the
major differences among callings that use the term, substantive dif-
ferences exist regarding the meaning of the word "profession"; sec-
ond, means can be devised for maintaining the so-called professional
status and nevertheless making all business forms available to the
74. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1361.
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